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States Atomic Energy Commission, Vol. 3.) Richard G. 
Hewlett and Jack M. Holl. 725 pp. University ofCalifor­
nia Press, Berkeley, 1989. Price: $60.00 ISBN 0-520­
06018-0. (Reviewed by David Hafemeister.) 
Ifyou wish to become informed on the present history of 
nuclear arms control negotiations in the 1970s and 80s, 
read Strobe Talbott's trilogy: Endgame, Deadly Gambits, 
and Masterofthe Game. Ifyou wish to become informed on 
the in-depth, historical beginnings of the atomic age, read 
Richard Hewlett's trilogy: The New World, 1939-1946, 
Atomic Shield, 1947-1952, and the subject of this review, 
the recently released AtomsforPeace and War, 1953-1961. 
Since Hewlett was the official historian of the Atomic En­
ergy Commission, writing the history of the AEC from 
AEC and National Security Council classified documents, 
one might be concerned that history might be written to 
justify the past actions of the AEC. I am convinced, how­
ever, that Hewlett and Holl deserve both great respect and 
gratitude for unbiased reporting and honeSt analysis. Pri­
marily, Hewlett and Holl write history, without many val­
ue judgments. If something was clearly silly, like the nu­
clear-propelled airplane, they say so by implication. Ike 
was dismayed that the AEC would spend funds on this 
unlikely project just because the air force wanted it, yet his 
administration continued to fund it. For something much 
more complicated, like Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace, 
they refrain from passing judgment, but rather inform us 
by using classified documentation to tell us what was at 
issue, and how it was decided. This book tells the story of 
the conflict between two quite different men: Eisenhower 
and Lewis Strauss, the Chairman of the AEC. The authors 
buttress present-day revisionist historians by showing that 
Eisenhower was an activist president, leading his govern­
ment to ban all nuclear weapons tests ( 1958-61 ), to negoti­
ate a cutoff on the production of plutonium and highly 
enriched uranium ("the fissile cutoff'), and to promote 
the peaceful atom with safeguards through the creation of 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). On the 
other hand, as one might expect, Strauss was very protec­
tive of the AEC's right to produce plutonium and carry out 
weapons tests. 
In order to focus this review, I will mainly cover just two 
topics: first, the Atoms for Peace Plan; and second, the 
nuclear test ban moratorium. Thus we will skip such inter­
esting topics as the Oppenheimer trial and the development 
of the commercial nuclear fuel cycle in the US. The title of 
the book, Atomsfor Peace and War, aptly expresses Eisen­
hower's dream to reach out to the world with peaceful nu­
clear power, and somehow tame the military atom (while 
also continuing to build Polaris and other weapons). In 
retrospect, he did a rather good job of carrying out this 
lofty plan, considering the hand he was dealt and the uncer­
tain information that was at his disposal. Early on in 1953, 
Ike decided that more candor and honesty were necessary 
on the effects ofnuclear weapons, stating that, " ...personal­
ly I think the time has arrived when the American people 
must have more information on this subject, if they are to 
act intelligently.. .! think the time has come to be far more, 
let us say, frank with the American people than we have 
been in the past" (p. 55). By informing the public more 
about the effects of megaton blasts, but not informing the 
public about the danger to uranium miners and the fall-out 
at St. George, Utah, the goals of "candor" were only par­
tially fulfilled. By amending the Atomic Energy Act of 
1946, some of the secrets of the atom were unclassified in 
order to establish the commercial fuel cycle. Atoms for 
Peace ultimately creates a dilemma. Greater access by oth­
er countries to nuclear methods and special nuclear materi­
al has, of course, eased their transition to the bomb. This 
doesn't sound like Atoms for Peace, but rather Atoms for 
War. However, the opposite side of the coin is created by 
the carrot of supposedly cheaper nuclear power, which has 
encouraged nations to give up some of their sovereignty by 
(1) abstaining from nuclear weapons and (2) allowing in­
ternational inspectors into their nuclear facilities. A very 
good result is that all but a half-dozen of the non-nuclear 
weapon states that have nuclear power have agreed to the 
bargain of safeguards on all their nuclear facilities. How­
ever, one wonders if Ike was somewhat misled on the ulti­
mate dilemma of Atoms for Peace when he stated to the 
United Nations on 8 December 1953 that, "The ingenuity 
of our scientists will provide special safe conditions under 
which such a bank of fissionable material can be made es­
sentially immune to surprise seizure." What was he refer­
ring to? Denatured plutonium with 240pU won't prevent 
weapons; it only complicates the production of quality 
weapons. The plutonium produced in the commercial sec­
tor is more accessible than nonexistent plutonium. How­
ever, Ike did initiate a somewhat sturdy regime, the best 
one we have, in that famous speech by stating that the nu­
clear nations "begin now and continue to make joint contri­
butions from their stockpiles of normal uranium fission­
able materials to an International Atomic Energy Agency" 
to be established under the aegis of the United Nations (p. 
72). It was hoped that Atoms for Peace would somehow 
solve future proliferation problems of the atom, break the 
disarmament stalemate with the Soviets, and enhance the 
prestige of the US (p. 215). Eisenhower's aim was to lessen 
Cold War tensions and to siphon offweapon-grade materi­
al from existing nuclear stockpiles (p. 225). As the policy 
process unfolded, it is apparent that the US government 
did not discuss and understand all the paths to nuclear 
proliferation (p. 222). Power reactors produce about 250 
kg per year of reactor-grade Pu that can be made into lower 
quality weapons by less sophisticated nations. Initially the 
US was going to require "the return of all spent fuel and 
nuclear by-products for reprocessing in the US"; however, 
this was not required in the early agreements of coopera­
tion with other countries (p. 227). We are still grappling 
with these issues today. By offering to contribute 100 kg of 
fissionable material, the process gained momentum. At 
first the Soviets were skeptical about proliferation from 
Atoms and Peace, but in time they joined in. By 1955, the 
peaceful atom was used as a tool to entice other nations to 
be helpful with our foreign policy (p. 239). Easy financing 
from the Export-Import Bank helped launch a large ex­
port industry. All of these negotiations took place before 
nuclear power had become a reality; our first commercial 
power plant at Shippingport first operated on 2 December 
1957. The driving force behind the policy was Ike's strong 
belief that without a peaceful atom the world was doomed. 
In 1957, the National Security Council concluded that the 
US "would try to persuade other governments to accept the 
international safeguard provisions in the agreements for 
cooperation..." (p. 439). Ultimately, the Nuclear Nonpro­
liferation Treaty and tightened export laws have nudged 
most nations toward "full-scope" safeguards, but only 
after a period of years to convince other nations to accept 
inspectors ofother nations on their soil. The authors do not 
pass final judgment on the Atoms for Peace plan. In my 
opinion, Atoms for Peace, on balance, was a success, con­
sidering that ultimately there are no technical barriers to 
the bomb for medium-sized countries. Certainly, we have 
accelerated some near-term proliferation by technology 
transfer and training with India and Israel, but an interna­
tional regime has been established under the IAEA, the 
NPT, and the nuclear supplier nations. This is no small 
accomplishment. Only under Ike's leadership could this 
have been possible. Only time will tell if the world has 
gained more than it has lost in terms of the vertical and 
horizontal arms race. It is hard to imagine world stability 
without these norms. 
The Castle Bravo shot on 1 March 1954 tested the US's 
first "dry" hydrogen bomb. The fallout from the 6 megaton 
Castle Bravo gave doses as high as 1000 REM, 200 miles 
from the explosion. Unfortunately, the Lucky Dragon fish­
ing vessel was in its path, 90 miles away, and all 23 Japanese 
crew members suffered from radiation exposure. As one 
can imagine, public opinion on nuclear testing was greatly 
inflamed, encouraging Eisenhower to look for a solution. 
Strauss and the AEC Commissioners did cover things up as 
much as possible: "Within the Commission, however, 
there was much less evidence of compassion for the fisher­
men and more concern about the security and scientific 
implications" (p. 177). As early as April 1954, Eisenhower 
and Dulles decided to explore the possibility of ending all 
thermonuclear testing (p. 223). Yet, over the years, Eisen­
hower continued to test nuclear weapons. "He expressed 
his frustration at having to conduct extensive tests on the 
one hand while professing readiness to suspend testing in a 
disarmament program on the other" (p. 457). Interest­
ingly enough, the early US proposals were tied to the fissile 
cutoff, a ban on the production ofplutonium for weapons, a 
proposal that favored the US at that time. The day after the 
conference of experts adjourned in Geneva, Eisenhower 
announced on 22 August 1958 that the US would unilater­
ally suspend all nuclear weapons testing, provided the nu­
clear powers could establish an effective inspection system 
and make substantial progress on arms control (p. 546). 
Unilaterally, Ike had changed US and NATO policy. He 
had established a comprehensive test ban (0 kiloton limit) 
without the sophisticated verification technologies that we 
have today. Ultimately the Soviets joined this moratorium, 
which lasted until 1 September 1961, when the Soviets 
broke the moratorium. By today's standards, this was an 
incredible set of circumstances, a unilaterial US act, soon 
followed by the Soviets, for a total ban of nuclear tests 
which could not be verified down to the zero kiloton level, 
and which did not allow for inspections. Ike did admit that 
he favored continued underground testing, but he conclud­
ed that world opinion against testing was more powerful 
than thermonuclear weapons. And Ike moved over the ob­
jections of Lewis Strauss and Edward Teller, who wished 
to promote the testing of clean "bombs" and the peaceful 
nuclear explosions of Project Plowshare. Ike told Strauss 
that the AEC alternatives "led nowhere but to an indefinite 
arms race; at least Dulles' p0sition might be a step toward 
general disarmament" (p. 546). And it did work-for 3 
years. Had the moratorium been maintained, we would not 
be faced today with the destablizing MIRVs that are placed 
on the SS-18 and MX missiles. This history lesson remains 
with us today. Now that dangers from nuclear fallout from 
nuclear testing have been eliminated by testing under­
ground, public opinion against testing is not nearly as 
strong as in the 1950s. Nevertheless, underground nuclear 
testing does allow further modernization of weapons such 
as the earth-penetrating warhead, and that is why the Com­
prehensive Test Ban Treaty is still an issue today. 
These two events, the Atoms for Peace Plan and the nu­
clear test moratorium of 1958-61, are impressive. Looking 
back to the prerevisionist days, I recall that Eisenhower 
was demeaned as a not-very-bright, golf-playing, former 
general. The authors argue that he deserved a much better 
epitaph than that. His farewell address gave us an indica­
tion that there was a much greater dimension to this man: 
In the councils of government, we must guard against 
the acquistion ofunwarranted influence, whether sought 
or unsought, by the military-industrial complex...Only 
an alert knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper 
meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery 
of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that 
security and liberty may prosper together...Partly be­
cause of the huge costs involved, a government contract 
becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosi­
ty.. .In holding scientific research and discovery in re­
spect, as we would, we must also be alert to the equal and 
opposite danger that public policy could itself become 
the captive of a scientific-technological elite...Because 
this need is so sharp and apparent, I confess that I lay 
down my official responsibilities in this field with a defi­
nite sense of disappointment...As one who knows that 
another war could utterly destroy this civilization which 
has been so slowly and painfully built over thousands of 
years-I wish I could say tonight that a lasting peace is 
in sight (p. 563). 
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